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1. Introduction 
Truthmaker theorists hold that at least for some true propositions there is something 
in the world that makes them true and call this thesis “the truthmaker principle”. Enti-
ties playing this role are described as the truthmakers of the propositions that they 
make true. Any truth, then, depends on their truthmakers, is grounded in them, and is 
true in virtue of them. Something worldly, different from the proposition, grounds 
and explains its truth. Most common accounts of the notion of truthmaker include as 
a necessary condition for being a truthmaker of a proposition that truthmakers should 
be metaphysically sufficient for the truth of the proposition:  
(N) If x makes <p> true, then x exists and necessarily, if x exists then <p> is 
true.1 
Under these assumptions, the task of finding good prima facie candidates of truthmak-
ers for some truths does not look especially troublesome. A singular existential propo-
sition as <Aristotle exists> is made true by Aristotle, a general existential proposition 
like <There are human beings> is made true by each human being, a singular predica-
tive proposition like <This wall is yellow> is made true by the fact that this wall is yel-
low, or perhaps by this particular yellowness of the wall. All these statements are far 
from being absolutely uncontroversial, but they are relatively undisputed given the 
former assumptions which are held by many truthmaker theorists. 
 Truthmaker maximalist theorists assert that all truths are made true by some entity 
or some entities in the world. Maximalism has some trouble with logically true propo-
sitions since their truth does not seem to depend on the world; those propositions 
seem to be grounded in their own nature. A natural reaction is to weaken maximalism 
by exempting logically true propositions from the truthmaker requirement. However, 
                                                     
1 Following common usages and assumptions: I will assume that truthbearers are propositions, ‘<p>’ will 
stand for ‘the proposition that p’, and I will call the thesis (N) that truthmakers are metaphysically 
sufficient for their truths “truthmaker necessitarianism”. 
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there are other kinds of propositions whose truth clearly seems to depend on the 
world that put truthmaker theorists in trouble when they try to provide truthmakers 
for them. Among them, negative (contingently) true propositions of the following 
forms:2  
 (1) Negative predicative propositions: <a is not F> 
 (2) Negative general existential propositions: <There are no Fs> 
 (3) Negative partially general existential propositions: <There are no Fs in r> 
Consider a proposition of type (2): <There are no white ravens>. What could be a 
plausible truthmaker for this proposition? Things seem to be more difficult now than 
they were with the former paradigmatic cases. Is the sum of all actual (black) ravens 
the truthmaker for <There are no white ravens>? It does not seem so. It does not sa-
tisfy truthmaker necessitarianism, since it seems that the sum can coexist with a white 
raven. Is it the whole world? It does not seem so, either. The whole world could have 
included an extra white raven. Is it then the absence of white ravens that is the truth-
maker of <There are no white ravens>? Well, what could such a thing be? 
 It should also be noted that finding truthmakers for propositions of type (4) and 
(5) will not be an easy task, given the logical relations holding between propositions of 
type (2) and (4), and type (3) and (5): 
 (4) Universal propositions: <All Fs are Gs> 
 (5) Partially universal propositions: <All Fs in r are G>. 
2. Molnar's tetrad 
In this section I will present Molnar’s way of stating the problem of negative proposi-
tions and will show that two recent objections to it are not convincing. Molnar ex-
plains the problem of truthmakers for negatives by pointing out that the following 
statements do not look compatible: 
 (i) The world is everything that exists. 
(ii) Everything that exists is positive. 
 (iii) Some negative claims about the world are true. 
 (iv) Every true claim about the world is made true by something that exists  
  (Molnar 2000, 72) 
Molnar holds that (i)-(iv) jointly imply that: 
 (v) Negative truths are made true by positive existing entities.3  
The entailed statement is not, according to Molnar, strictly a contradiction. Still, there 
is a tension, since “the quartet may not be co-tenable” (Molnar 2000, p. 72). As (i)-(iv) 
are individually plausible, the challenge for the truthmaker theorist will be either to 
explain how negative propositions can be made true by positive entities, or to reject one 
                                                     
2 Other controversial truths are true disjunctions and conjunctions. I won’t discuss them here, but see: 
Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006), Read (2000) and Lopez de Sa (ms.) 
3 I think that (i) is redundant. It seems clear that (ii)-(iv) suffice to entail (v). It would play a role if (iv) were 
replaced by (iv’) Every true claim about the world is made true by something in the world. 
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of (i)-(iv) and to provide a justification of how such a prima facie plausible statement 
can be rejected.  
 Cameron and Parsons dismiss Molnar’s strategy based on the tetrad (i)-(iv) as a 
good approach to the problem of negatives on similar grounds (Cameron, ms.; Par-
sons, 2006.) They both agree that (ii) is too far from being clear, since we have no 
good understanding of what a positive entity is.  
 Parsons argues that whatever ‘positive’ means in (ii), it cannot have the same kind 
of meaning as ‘negative’ has in (iii), since in the latter case the term is applied in virtue 
of the representational properties of the proposition, but there are no such representa-
tional properties in the former case. Thus, he says: “there is, prima facie, an equivoca-
tion in any attempt to make (i) through (iv) into an inconsistent tetrad.” (Parsons 
2006, p. 592) Alternatively, it can be said that the entailed statement (v) is not incon-
sistent since the occurrences of ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ in it are equivocal.  
 This is true, but misses the point. I don’t think that Molnar is trying to show that 
there is a real inconsistency in the tetrad. The point is rather that, apparently, (iii) and 
(iv) jointly lead us to posit negative entities as truthmakers, and this seems to conflict 
with the apparently sensible metaphysical thesis (ii). Let us assume that (iii) is true. 
What, then, can make true <There are no unicorns> or <This rose is not red>? “The 
absence of unicorns and the lack of redness in this rose” is a natural but dubious an-
swer since, by (iv), absences and lacks should be then existing entities. But these are 
paradigmatic negative entities, against (ii). Molnar does not offer a full account of the 
notion of positive entity, but it is surely intended to exclude absences and lacks from 
its domain. There is strictly no contradiction here, since we are not led to conclude 
that (ii) is false through an argument that relies on an analysis of the concept of posi-
tive entity. However, it is shown that there is still a tension, since the entities which are 
apparently required by (iii)-(iv) are paradigmatic instances of non-positive entities. 
 Arguing for a similar conclusion against Molnar’s strategy, Cameron argues that 
clear applications of ‘positive’ can only be found in the domain of representations, by 
appealing to the way they represent. ‘Positive’ can be applied also to non-
representational entities but only in a derivative sense (Cameron, manuscript: 3.) 
<There is a donkey> is positive because it represents something to be the case. 
<There is not a talking donkey> is negative because it represents something not to be 
the case. A representation is positive if it represents something to be the case, or nega-
tive if it represents something not to be the case. A non-representational entity is neg-
ative if it corresponds to a negative proposition, or positive otherwise. Given these as-
sumptions, Cameron objects that (ii) would amount to saying that nothing corres-
ponds to a negative proposition, but this would entail that negative propositions have 
no truthmakers. Thus, (ii) would be useless in Molnar’s argument based on (i)-(iv), 
which is intended to show the dubious commitments of the thesis that negatives have 
truthmakers. 
 Although, on my view, positing negative entities is to fall into the representational 
fallacy of ascribing to the world features of our representations of it, I think that there 
is no need to appeal to representational features to make the concept of negative enti-
ty intelligible. We have indeed concepts that putatively refer to negative entities, like 
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absence, lack, omission, or void. I will now advance a non-representational characterization 
of negative entities which I think is plausible. My aim is to suggest a defensible crite-
rium for negativeness which can be employed to vindicate the argument that shows 
that there is a tension in (ii)-(iv). 
 Negative entities, if located, have a common negative causal feature. They don’t sa-
tisfy the disjunctive causal condition for positiveness in (C):  
(C) A concrete entity is positive if and only if (a) is causally operative or (b) is a 
mereological aggregate of causally operative entities. 
Paradigmatically concrete entities are positive typically because they are both causally 
operative and a mereological aggregate of causally operative entities. However, an enti-
ty can be positive but not causally operative just because it is too big to interact with 
another, totally different entity. Take the whole world, the mereological aggregate of 
all (positive) events or states of affairs. There is no entity outside the world that can be 
caused by the world. Still, I think it is plausible to hold that an aggregate of positive 
entities is a positive entity.4 Thus, the world, being an aggregate of positive entities, is 
also a positive entity according to (C). 
 I hold that absences, lacks, voids and omissions are negative because there are 
good reasons to think that they do not satisfy neither (a) nor (b) in (C). First, note that 
if omissions are not causally operative, then their mereological parts are not causally 
operative. The reason is that mereological parts of omissions are also omissions. The 
same holds for lacks, voids and absences. Thus, if typical negative entities do not satis-
fy (a), then they do not satisfy (b) either. Second, although there may be a prima facie 
motivation to posit negative entities to account for the truth of omission and preven-
tion causal statements, there is no need to posit negative entities in the metaphysics of 
causation to account for those truths.5 Besides, the severe difficulties that plague the 
wide variety of theories of causation when they attempt to follow the prima facie mo-
tivation constitute an additional reason to avoid it.6 
3. Paving the way for exclusión accounts 
How should we react to Molnar’s argument? I think we should bite the bullet, accept 
(v), and then try to show how positive entities can make negative propositions true. 
What Molnar calls “exclusion accounts” take this line and I will argue that they are a 
satisfactory approach to the problem of negatives. I will develop this argument in two 
                                                     
4 Besides, aggregates of negative entities are negative as well. Aggregates of lacks are lacks, aggregates of 
omissions are omissions, aggregates of absences are absences, and aggregates of voids are voids. 
5 See, for instance, Dowe (2000, pp. 129-145) and Beebee (2004).  
6 The latter point is especially clear in physical accounts of causation. In tranference theories of causation, 
flow of energy or momentum from one object to another is required for causation. However, there is 
simply no such transference involved in preventions and omissions. In Dowe’s Conserved Quantity 
Theory, causes and effects must be linked by a set of causal processes and interactions. But there isn’t 
such a set of causal processes that links omissions to their purported effects or prevented effects to 
their preventive causes. For more on this point and also on how negative entities are problematic for 
very different accounts of causation, see Dowe (2000, pp. 123-129). 
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steps. First, I will answer in the rest of this section two standing general objections in 
the literature against exclusion accounts. In the last section, I will show how some par-
ticular exclusion account deals fairly well with the problem of negatives. 
 Exclusion accounts bite the bullet of Molnar’s argument and accept (v). Positive 
truthmakers for negatives can be provided; no appeal to negative facts is needed to 
ground negatives. In this section I will discuss Molnar’s objections to this approach. 
Molnar describes the exclusion strategy as follows:  
 The simplest theory of truthmakers for negative statements would say that for any 
negative statement stating that a does not have the property F (or that there are no 
Fs), there is a positive state of affairs which excludes a’s being F (or excludes the exis-
tence of Fs) (Molnar 2000, p. 73). 
 In terms of propositions, this can be stated as follows: 
 (I) 
 (i) If <a is not F> is true then there is a (positive) x such that x excludes a’s being
     F 
(ii) If <There are no Fs > is true then there is a (positive) x such that x excludes 
the existence of Fs. 
What notion of exclusion is at stake here? Molnar says: “I use ‘excludes’ here in the 
sense that one particular, A, excludes another, B, if A and B cannot co-exist of strict 
necessity.” (Molnar 2000, p. 73). Following Molnar’s analysis of the exclusion relation, 
let’s consider (E): 
 (E) x excludes y iff necessarily, if x exists then y does not exist. 
From (I) and (E), it follows: 
 (IE) 
(i) If <a is not F> is true then there is a (positive) x such that necessarily, if x exists 
then a is not F. 
(ii) If <There are no Fs > is true then there is a (positive) x such that necessarily, if 
x exists then there are no Fs. 
 
Now, I will present and reject two general objections against (IE) raised by Molnar. 
Objection 1 
Molnar’s first objection is an adaptation of Russell and Grossmann’s criticism of the 
attempts to explain negative truths by reference to their incompatibility with positive 
truths: 
We can only explain the truth of ¬q by reference to the truth of p if p is incompatible with ¬q. For 
the explanation to work, ‘p is incompatible with q’ must be true. But this is a negative statement. Ex-
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planations of negative truths by incompatibility cannot succeed as reductive explanations because 
such explanations themselves rely on a negative statement. Grossmann’s argument can be readily 
translated into the language of this paper, because Exclusion is what sentential incompatibility be-
comes when we make a semantic descent. ( I’ll not make the translation here.) (Molnar 2000, p. 74)7 
Let us consider: 
(I*) <¬q> is true iff there is a (positive) proposition <p> such that <p> is true 
and <p> is incompatible with <q> 
 As I understand Grossmann’s objection, it runs as follows. (I*) does not work as a 
reductive explanation of the truth of negative propositions, since a negative proposi-
tion (<p is incompatible with q>) is involved in the explanans. Understanding the 
truth-conditions of any negative proposition <¬q> would presuppose understanding 
the truth-conditions of the corresponding negative proposition stating incompatibility 
(<p is incompatible with q>) used in the explanans. This is fine. 
 If we make the translation omitted by Molnar to obtain an argument against (I), we 
have that explanations like (I), that appeal to exclusion, cannot succeed as reductive 
explanations of the truth of a negative proposition because they rely on a negative 
proposition (<x excludes y>, which, according to (E), is equivalent to <necessarily, if 
x exists then y does not exist>). This is also fine. 
 However, this argument that results from translation into the language of truth-
makers doesn’t work as an objection against the truthmaker exclusion account of neg-
ative propositions given in (I). For, (I) need (and should) not be understood as a reduc-
tive explanation of the truth of negative propositions, but as a thesis stating necessary 
conditions for a negative proposition to be true that reveals the ontological (positive) 
ground of the truth of the proposition. (I) holds that negative facts are not needed as 
an ontological ground of negative truths. Truthmakers are the ontological ground of 
negative truths and they are positive entities. Thus, negative truths are grounded on 
positive entities only.8 
 Still, it could be objected that (I) does not avoid negative facts altogether. Exclu-
sion is a negative fact; strictly speaking, exclusion is a modal fact that involves a nega-
tive fact. It is true that (I) does not posit negative entities as truthmakers. Nothing es-
tablishes that x must be negative. However, the condition for being a truthmaker in-
volves a negative proposition (the proposition whose truth is at issue, precisely) and 
this seems bad enough. Negative propositions are still required to specify what it is to 
be a (positive) truthmaker for a negative proposition. 
 But this won’t do either. Given that (IE) can be considered as a kind of instance of 
(T), an argument analogous to Objection (1) could be raised against truthmaking 
                                                     
7 See also Armstrong 2004, pp. 60-61. 
8 It should be remarked also that even a biconditional version of (I), stating necessary and sufficient con-
ditions, need not be understood as a reductive analysis of the truth for negatives. Note that if we 
leave aside reference to the positive, (IE) displays instances of the usual truthmaking necessitarian ac-
count of truth: (T) If <p> is true then there is an x such that necessarily, if x exists then p. For the 
usual purposes of truthmaking theory, (T*) would be no worst that (T): (T*) If <p> is true then there 
is an x such that necessarily, if x exists then <p> is true.In effect, (T*) cannot be intended as an at-
tempt to reductively explain the truth of the proposition. See Lowe (2006). 
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theory in general to conclude that it cannot dispense with trivial truthmakers. Most 
truthmaker theorists that embrace (T) also hold that the truthmaker for a proposition 
does not need to mirror the structure of the proposition. To take a classical example: 
<Cyril has hepatitis> is not made true by a compound made of Cyril and a property, 
having hepatitis. The fact that Cyril has hepatitis is a complex fact involving small 
parts of Cyril’s organism having micro-properties and being in several different rela-
tions to each other. Now, consider the following argument for the conclusion that (T) 
entails mirroring. The argument is analogous to Objection 1. Note that necessitation is 
a modal fact that involves the fact that mirrors the proposition whose truth is at issue. 
Facts mirroring the proposition are still required to specify what it is to be a truth-
maker for a proposition, even if the truthmaker does not mirror the proposition. 
 I think that this argument does not work. (T) does not entail mirroring and does 
not trivialize truthmaking. (T) leaves open whether the truthmaker mirrors or not the 
proposition it makes true. In some cases (propositions concerning basic objects in-
stantiating fundamental properties), the truthmaker x will be identical to the fact that 
p. In other cases, the truthmaker will be the part of the reductive basis of the fact that 
p. 
 Quite similarly, (IE) does not commit us to negative facts. Truthmakers for nega-
tive propositions are positive entities, which constitute the basis for reducing negative 
facts, since (IE) states that negative facts are determined by positive entities. It is true 
that in stating how negative facts are determined, these negative facts have to be men-
tioned in (IE), but this does not entail that the account is flawed by circularity. 
Objection 2  
According to Molnar, (IE) fails to account for purely accidental negatives, negative 
states of affairs which are not necessitated by anything positive (Molnar 2000, p. 75, 
Armstrong 2004: 62-63). 
 Let’s consider his example: “Marie is a particular atom in a pile of radium atoms. 
At time t, Marie is not in a decay state. There seems to be no positive state of affairs ex-
isting at t that either logically or nomically excludes Mary’s being in a decay state at t” 
(Molnar 2000, p. 75). 
 As I understand Molnar’s example, this is so because the indeterministic laws in-
volved in decay processes warrant that there are possible worlds w and w* such that 
Marie’s positive states of affairs at t are identical in both worlds, except for the fact 
that Marie is in a decay state in w (at time t) and Marie is not in a decay state in w* (at 
time t). Marie’s positive states of affairs at t do not determine the truth of the proposi-
tion. 
 Be this as it may, I find this example unconvincing. What does it mean for a pile of 
radium atoms to be in a decay state in an instant t? Decay is a process constituted by a 
series of temporally continuous states. Hence, it can be said that Marie is in decay state 
at time t if that state is part of a process of certain type (decay type). But then, being in 
a decay state at time t is not an intrinsic property of that state. No surprise, then, that 
the truth of <Marie is not in a decay state at t> is not determined by Marie’s positive 
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states of affairs at t, since it depends on former and latter states of Marie. But, a rea-
son should be given to justify that these other states cannot be positive. 
 Molnar also says that if it is assumed that laws are contingent and necessitation is 
conceived in a narrow sense9 there are lots of cases like this. Think of laws like <If p is 
in state A then p is not F>. Assume that the only nomic determiner of p’s not being F 
is precisely its being in state A. As this determiner is contingent, there are possible 
worlds where p is in state A but is F. 
 But again, this kind of argument is unconvincing. What it shows is that there can 
be no nomic determiners of the truth of a negative predicative proposition. But it 
does not show that the putative negative fact that corresponds to the proposition is 
not necessitated in the narrow sense by positive facts concerning the entities that the 
proposition is about. And the latter, but not the former, is indeed what is required for 
the exclusion account to work. The fact that this wall is fully red necessitates in the 
narrow sense the truth of the negative proposition <This wall is not fully green>. It is 
irrelevant that nomic determiners of the negative state of not being fully green fail to 
necessitate in the narrow sense the truth of the negative proposition <This wall is not 
fully green>. 
  Another supposed example of purely accidental negatives mentioned by Molnar is 
<This liquid is odourless>.10 Armstrong and Dodd generalize on this example: any 
proposition stating that an object has no determinate in the whole series of a deter-
minable will raise the same problem (Armstrong 2004, pp. 62-63 and Dodd 2007, p. 
387.) No positive property of the liquid seems to be involved in what makes true 
<This liquid is odourless>. It’s rather the lack or absence of a positive property that 
seems to make the proposition true. Indeed, this is what is suggested by the logical 
form of the proposition stating that something has a negative property and by its con-
trast with <This wall is not fully green>. It is not difficult to find a positive excluder 
for the wall being fully green, due to the exclusion relation that holds between differ-
ent determinates of the same determinable. <This liquid is odourless>, however, 
states that something has none of the determinates of a determinable, so we should 
not expect to find a simple positive excluder as we did in the former case. But no ar-
gument is given to show that an excluder cannot be found. Cases like this should be 
understood as “hard cases”, advanced to challenge the exclusion theorist. A full ac-
count of the odourless liquid would depend on particular views on secondary qualities 
and surely also on specific empirical details of perceptual processes. I won’t go into 
these details, but it seems plausible to say that there are positive states of affairs con-
cerning this liquid such that they grant that the impact that it has on the olfactory sen-
sitive receptors of certain organisms falls under certain threshold, or leaves them in-
tact.  
                                                     
9 A ‘logical’ sense, Molnar says, but we can call it ‘metaphysical’. 
10 The example is borrowed from Mulligan, Simons & Smith (1984). 
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4. What are the deliveries of exclusion accounts? 
In this section I will present and discuss Cheyne and Pidgen’s (2006) exclusion ac-
count of negative propositions. I will also argue that their account of general existen-
tial propositions can be secured against Parsons’ (2006) objections. First, take a nega-
tive predicative true proposition of type (1), like <Theaetetus is not flying> and sup-
pose that Theaetetus is sitting on the ground. According to Cheyne and Pidgen the 
truthmaker of this proposition is the sum of all positive facts involving Theaetetus, 
which they gloss as Theaetetus as he actually is (Cheyne and Pidgen 2006, p. 259). Note 
that Theaetetus’ sitting on the ground excludes that Theaetetus is flying, since it is not 
possible that Theaetetus is sitting on the ground and flying at the same time. Thus, as 
Theaetetus’ sitting on the ground is a part of Theaetetus as he actually is, Theaetetus as he ac-
tually is necessitates the truth of <Theaetetus is not flying>. This is clearly an exclusion 
account, since the truth of a negative predicative proposition <a is not F> is grounded 
on something that excludes a being F. 
 Let us consider a negative partially general existential proposition: <There is no 
hippopotamus in Room S223>. Assume that each positive fact concerning a part of 
the room excludes that there are hippopotamuses in that part of the room and call 
what is essentially the sum of all such positive facts ‘Room’. Thus, ‘Room’ names the 
room as it actually is. An instance of these kind of positive facts would be the fact that 
Peter is sitting in this chair in the room. Given how Peter and the chair are actually ar-
ranged, it is excluded that there is a hippo seated in this chair in the room.11 Similarly, 
any positive fact concerning a part of the room excludes a hippo being in that part of 
the room. Thus, Room, which is essentially the aggregate of all such positive facts, ex-
cludes that there is a hippo in the room, so Room necessitates the truth of <There is 
no hippopotamus in Room S223>.12 Room seems then well suited as a ground for the 
truth of the proposition. Truths of kind (5) have a similar treatment. 
 Cheyne and Pidgen conclude that there is no need to bring in a negative fact to 
ground the truth of negative partially general existential propositions and try to block 
an argument for an opposite conclusion. First, take a set of propositions P that states 
                                                     
11 What does ground that the exclusion relation holds between Peter’s sitting in the chair and a hippo be-
ing seated in the chair? It could be thought that it is not sufficiently grounded if it depends on laws of 
nature which are contingent ― as it could be argued. Although this objection could be answered by 
arguing for the necessity of laws, I think that this is not needed. In my view, what grounds this exclu-
sion relationship is the following: (i) the fact that humans and hippos are essentially material objects 
and (ii) the metaphysical principle that holds that two different material objects cannot occupy the 
same spatio-temporal region. (It must be noted that this principle should be amended as to allow the 
well known cases of objects related by the constitution relation. A statue and the piece of clay that 
constitutes it can share their spatio-temporal location, but they are not strictly identical since they 
have different modal properties. The principle can be amended either by replacing ‘different’ by a 
more strict term that excludes different but constitution-related objects or by allowing co-occupancy 
just to objects sharing all their natural properties.) 
12 It is true that if Room 223 were bigger than it actually is it might include a hippo. So, Room 223 does 
not necessitate that there is no hippo in the room. However, Room itself (as opposed to Room 223) 
could not be bigger than it actually is as it has its intrinsic properties essentially. Hence, Room neces-
sitates the hippo proposition. 
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Room. They note that P does not entail <There is no hippopotamus in Room S223>, 
since, for P to entail <There is no hippopotamus in Room S223>, P should include a 
proposition stating that there are no more first order facts concerning the room ―call 
it <p*>. Thus, Room does not necessitate <There is no hippopotamus in Room 
S223> and, by necessitarianism, it is not a suitable truthmaker for this proposition.13 
 Cheyne and Pidgen’s reply to this argument is mistaken, as Parsons shows (Parsons 
2006: 598-600) But there is a good answer to it. The relation of necessitation involved 
in truthmaker necessitarianism is a de re modal relation. Let us assume that the fact 
that water is wet makes true <Liquid H20 is wet>. As water is in fact liquid H2O, the 
fact that water is wet is the fact that liquid H2O is wet. Hence, the fact that water is 
wet necessitates the truth of <Liquid H20 is wet>. This de re necessitation relation is 
not a logical, purely conceptual relation. In the example, it holds in virtue of the nature 
of water, although such nature cannot be attained by purely conceptual means. How-
ever, we should note that <Water is wet> does not logically entail <Liquid H20 is 
wet>; that is, there is no a priori, purely conceptual connection between the two 
propositions. An additional premise (<Water is liquid H2O>) is needed to obtain the 
conclusion by a priori means. We can conclude that a fact necessitating the truth of a 
proposition does not require that any proposition that states that fact must logically 
entail that proposition.  
 Now, observe that the argument for negative facts must make use of the notion of 
logical entailment to get off the ground. It is true that for P to logically entail <There is 
no hippopotamus in Room S223>, P should include a proposition stating that there 
are no more first order facts concerning the room. However, this does not grant the 
success of the argument, since it still does not show that Room does not necessitate 
the truth of <There is no hippopotamus in Room S223>. This is how I think Cheyne 
and Pidgen should answer the argument for negative facts based on the truth of nega-
tive partially general existential propositions. 
 Now, let us consider the true negative general existential proposition <There are 
no unicorns>. Cheyne and Pidgen’s exclusion account of the truth of this proposition 
is the following: “the (first-order) way the universe actually is (a very large and complex fact, 
but a positive fact nonetheless) makes it true that there are no unicorns” (Cheyne and 
Pidgen 2006: 257). Let us call ‘Worldy’ to this big fact. Note that the set of proposi-
tions W that states Worldy does not logically entail <There are no unicorns>, since a 
totality proposition should be added to the set that states closure on the collection of 
first-order facts. However, as we observed formerly, this does not suffice to show that 
Worldy does not necessitate the truth of <There are no unicorns>. This modal de re 
relation between Worldy and the truth of the proposition can still hold, provided that 
Worldy’s existence excludes that there are unicorns.  
                                                     
13 Moreover, this line of reasoning can be taken as a first step in a more complex argument for the need 
of totality facts. It has been concluded that only a set of propositions including at least those of P and 
<p*> entails <There is no hippopotamus in Room S223>. Then it is plausible to hold that <There is 
no hippopotamus in Room S223> is jointly made true by Room plus whatever makes true <p*>. 
But, what makes true <p*> is a totality fact: the fact that there are no more first order facts than 
those in Room. 
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 According to Cheyne and Pidgen, exclusion holds also in this case:  
([O]n the assumption that there are no unicorns) the universe would have to be a different way 
for unicorns to exist. Thus, the way the universe actually is would not exist and some other way the 
universe might have been would exist (namely a way which involved existing unicorns). In other 
words, for it to be false that that there are no unicorns, it is necessary for the actual configuration 
of the universe not to exist. Conversely, the existence of the actual configuration of the universe 
necessitates or makes true the proposition that there are no unicorns (Cheyne and Pidgen 2006, p. 
257). 
If correct, this argument would allow us to reject any claim for the existence of a total-
ity fact based on the insufficiency of W to necessitate the truth of <There are no un-
icorns>. For, if Worldy necessitates the truth of the proposition, so does the set of 
propositions W that state Worldy. 
 It is important in this concern to note that Parsons advances a sensible general re-
quirement that should be met by any attempt intended to solve the problem of nega-
tives by appealing to the fact that the world as it actually is necessitates the truth of the 
unicorn proposition. Note that there is the worry that the world as it actually is should 
be conceived as a negative entity in order to grant the required necessitation. For this 
reason, an explication of the notion of positive entity must be provided such that: the 
world as it actually is counts as a positive entity on that account, and it is shown that the 
world as it actually is necessitates the truth of the unicorn proposition in a way that the 
problem is not solved by fiat. I will argue now how Cheyne and Pidgen’s account can 
be shown to meet Parsons’s requirement. 
 A crucial point is then whether, as Cheyne and Pidgen claim, Worldy, the way the un-
iverse actually is, would not exist were a unicorn present. Parsons rejects this point, ar-
guing as follows. It is true that the fact that Worldy is configured as it actually is ne-
cessitates that it does not contain a unicorn, as it was true that Room necessitates the 
hippo proposition. However, Parsons claims that it is not true that the fact that Worl-
dy is configured as it actually is necessitates that there is no unicorn at all. For, there is 
possibly a world that contains two universes, one of which is Worldy and the other 
contains unicorns (Parsons 2006, p. 595).  
 Parsons discusses and rejects a possible reply to his counterexample, which I think 
is the right one. The possible world entertained is wrongly described: it does not con-
tain Worldy, but a mere intrinsic duplicate of it. Extrinsic, not only intrinsic, proper-
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ties are essential to Worldy.14 Worldy cannot show up in a possible world in an envi-
ronment different from the actual one.15 
 Although Cheyne and Pidgen give no clue as to why we should think that Worldy 
is a positive entity, we are now in good position to argue for this. Worldy, the universe 
having its actual intrinsic and extrinsic properties essentially, is a mereological aggre-
gate of causally operative entities. As it was argued in section 2, there are reasons to 
hold that no negative entity has this feature. Thus, on this interpretation, Cheyne and 
Pidgen account satisfies Parsons’ requirement stated before. 
 Actually, Parsons raises an objection to the present proposal: “an essentialist of 
this kind has to say something more principled about their essentialism. It’s not just 
obvious that anything worldy is essentially so. If this is Cheyne and Pidgen’s view, 
then they should say more about what, other than convenience for present theoretical 
purpose, this view has going for it” (Parsons 2006: 600-601).  
 I have no argument to show that anything worldy is essentially so. Maybe there is 
another worldly thing besides Worldy that differs from Worldy in being a world only 
contingently. However, this point should not be overestimated. Granted, having inde-
pendent reasons for positing Worldy would confer an important additional force to 
the account I am defending. But the lack of them just amounts to a relative weakness 
of the account, which should be assessed by comparing the account to other alterna-
tives. After all, I have given theoretical reasons for the existence Worldy. Our world, 
being essentially a world, is needed to account for the ontological ground of the truth 
of negatives. This is what I think we should buy into unless we are willing to embrace 
negative entities in our ontology. 
 I conclude that Worldy, the universe having essentially its actual intrinsic and ex-
trinsic properties, is a positive entity that necessitates the truth of the unicorn proposi-
tion, so it stands as a good candidate for making it true. 
5. Conclusions 
My main aim has been to show that there is a satisfactory way out to the problem of 
finding truthmakers for negatives suggested by Molnar’s tetrad. First, I have argued 
                                                     
14 It is not completely clear whether Cheyne and Pidgen intend to include extrinsic properties in the es-
sence of Worldy in their paper. On the one hand, as Parsons stresses, the analogy they draw between 
the hippo proposition and the unicorn proposition, and the fact that the hippo proposition only re-
quires that Room’s essence includes just intrinsic features, suggests that only intrinsic features are es-
sential to Worldy. On the other hand, Cheyne and Pidgen’s explicitly embrace the thesis that a thing as 
it actually is must include extrinsic features (when answering to another objection also raised by Par-
sons!). See Cheyne and Pidgen (2006, pp. 261-262). I consider that this second evidence trumps the 
first one. Other philosophers also adopt a solution of this kind. See Cameron (ms.), Lewis & Rosen 
(2003) and Schaffer (ms.). 
15 It should be noted that this does not commit us to negative extrinsic properties. As Worldy is not re-
lated to any external entity, it has no positive relational property. But, then, since there are no nega-
tive properties, Worldy has no extrinsic properties. When I say that Worldy has its extrinsic proper-
ties essentially what I mean is that any entity which differs from Worldy by having extrinsic proper-
ties must be different from Worldy. 
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that the two general objections that Molnar raises against exclusion accounts are not 
compelling. Second, I have argued that Cheyne and Pidgen’s specific exclusion ac-
count succeeds in providing truthmakers for negatives and also in avoiding a negative 
ontology.16 
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